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The arguments contained in this Reply Brief are limited to 
those issues raised on Cross-Appeal.x 
1
 Cross-Appellants object to Brookside's use of its reply 
brief to raise additional issues. In its new Exhibit A, 
Brookside omits the second page of that exhibit, (see Exhibit A 
hereto, which includes the omitted second page.) The second page 
of Exhibit A, together with Appendices C and E of Appellee's 
Brief, demonstrate that Sam Peebles had been making monthly lot 
rent payments since October, 1995 and was current in April, 1996 
when the 5-day "Notice to Quit" was served. The dates and 
amounts of payments as of April, 1996 are set forth on page 9, 
paragraph 28 of Appellee's Brief. (See also R. 571-574.) 
Brookside alleges that "Sam Peebles refused to sign a 
written lease with Brookside, as required by the [Mobile Home 
Park Residency Act]," and therefore he should be denied "the 
benefits provided by the Act." (Appellant's Reply Brief at 10) 
(citation omitted). When Sam Peebles was asked "Did you refuse 
to sign a new lease," he responded: "I never was presented one. 
[Jim Prentice] asked .me if I wanted to sign one. I told him I 
don't see why I need to. I'm already paying rent and I'm already 
under a lease ..."(R. 484, Sam Pebbles Depo. pg 36, lines 16-20.) 
Brookside points to a second failed sale of the Mobile Home 
by Peebles to Leroy Carlson and Tina Shayla. (Appellant's Reply 
Brief, page 16.) Sam Peebles signed his second lease with the 
Park after, and not before, that failed sale, (R. 570; R. 481, 
page 17, lines 6-7.) Thereafter, Sam Peebles only leased the 
Mobile Home. 
Brookside alleges that "the Peebles failed to raise [the 
waiver and estoppel] issue [s] during the summary judgment phase 
of this action." (Appellant's Brief, page 12.) The issue was 
specifically raised in Peebles' Amended Answer. R. 125. 
Brookside "switches gears" in its Reply Brief and claims 
that summary judgment was proper against Harold Peebles, Sam 
Peebles father. Harold Peebles was on title to the mobile home 
but never lived in the mobile home and never paid rent to the 
Park. Among other things, Harold Peebles was not named on the 5-
day "Notice to Quit" and therefore could never be in unlawful 
detainer. (See Appendice F to Appellee's Brief.) As discussed by 
Judge Fratto, no case was made against Harold Peebles at trial. 
(See Appellee's Brief, pp. 50-51.) No case was also made against 
Harold Peebles in Brookside's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 
440-467.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
allowing the "case" against Harold Peebles to go to trial. 
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I. THE JURY ERRED IN FINDING THAT BROOKSIDE'S REFUSAL TO 
MEET WITH MS. SOUTHWORTH OR TO ALLOW HER TO SUBMIT AN 
APPLICATION FOR RESIDENCY WAS NOT UNREASONABLE. 
Brookside ignores the central issue to Sam Peebles' claim 
that it was unreasonable for Brookside to refuse to meet with 
Jackie Southworth or to allow her to fill out an application for 
residency. In its Reply Brief, Brookside claims that Sam Peebles 
has failed to "marshal the evidence" on this issue. However, 
Brookside does not dispute that Jim Prentice, the Brookside 
mobile home park manager, refused to meet with or accept an 
application for residency from Jackie Southworth. That is all 
the evidence Peebles needs to "marshal" to prevail on this claim. 
Ms. Southworth made an appointment to meet with Jim 
Prentice, to fill out an application for residency and to review 
her financial information with Mr. Prentice. When she arrived, 
Jim Prentice testified that he "told her she had been denied by 
the owner" and he sent her away. (T. at 616, lines 18-19.) A 
mobile home park must at least meet with a prospective resident 
and provide them the opportunity to apply for residency. This 
was denied Ms. Southworth. 
Brookside cites testimony by Clair Patrick, Ms. Southworth's 
real estate agent, acknowledging that Ms. Southworth would have 
to have a credit check. (Appellant's Reply Brief at page 30.) 
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That is not the issue. The issue is that after Ms. Southworth 
had a credit check Brookside refused to meet with Jackie 
Southworth to discuss the financial issues that the credit check 
could not verify. 
Brookside claims that Jim Prentice's testimony regarding his 
inability to yell "impeached" Jackie Southworth's testimony. 
(Appellant's Brief at 3 0.) Whether Jim Prentice "yelled" at 
Jackie Southworth is not the issue. Jim Prentice did not dispute 
that he refused to meet with Ms. Southworth and refused to allow 
her to fill out an application for residency. (R. 616.) 
Brookside cites "to portions of the trial transcript wherein 
Ms. Southworth acknowledges that Western Reporting was unable to 
verify her employment or her account with Utah First Credit.2 
One purpose of Ms. Southworth's appointment with Jim Prentice was 
to verify her employment to Mr. Prentice and to provide him with 
information on her account with Utah First Credit. However, Jim 
Prentice refused to meet with her. He told her she had already 
been "denied by the owner." (T. at 616, lines 18-19.) Ms. 
2
 "In the testimony of Ms. Southworth, she acknowledged that 
her credit report from Western Reporting states that Western 
Reporting was unable "to verify her employment though the 
employment was at a company she owned." (Appellant's Reply Brief 
at 18) (citation omitted). "Ms. Southworth also acknowledged 
that her credit report from Western Reporting indicate [sic] that 
Western Reporting was unable to verify her account at Utah First 
Credit." Id. at 19 (citation omitted). 
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Southworth testified that "I would not allow any of my banks, or 
person[nel] to verify anything to anyone without [the] okay from 
me." (T. at 3 07, lines 23-24.) Therefore, she was prepared to 
"verify [her income] by tax returns at any time." (T. at 308, 
lines 4-5.) However, Brookside refused to meet with Ms. 
Southworth. Brookside did not give Ms. Southworth the 
opportunity to "verify" her income or otherwise provide credit 
information to Brookside. 
Brookside cites to testimony by Jim Prentice that he did not 
see tax returns or other financial information with Ms. 
Southworth when she came to his office. (Appellant's Reply 
Brief, page 32.) However, Jim Prentice does not deny that Ms. 
Southworth came to his office and he refused to meet with her. 
What Ms. Southworth may have had in her hand and what Mr. 
Prentice saw (or didn't see) in her hand is irrelevant. Jim 
Prentice didn't meet with her to find out what she was willing to 
provide to him. 
Brookside argues that "[t]he Peebles did not tender Ms. 
Southworth's tax returns into evidence to rebut Brookside's basis 
for denying her application and so the issue has not been 
preserved on appeal." (Appellant's Reply Brief at 32.) Alan 
Glover, the owner of the Park, testified that he had rejected Ms. 
Southworth because Western Credit had been "unable to verify 
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employment." (T. at 70.) Accordingly, the "basis" for Brookside 
rejecting Ms. Southworth had nothing to do with Ms. Southworth's 
tax returns. Brookside rejected Ms. Southworth because Western 
Credit had been "unable to verify employment." Ms. Southworth7s 
tax returns had nothing to do with the reason Ms. Southworth was 
rejected as a prospective resident of the Park and were not 
required to be introduced into evidence. Estate of Morrison v. 
West One Trust Co., 933 P.2d 1015 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the case 
on which Brookside relies is inapposite.3 
Brookside states that "Ms. Southworth's credit report 
indicating that the credit agency was unable to verify her 
employment or bank account is sufficient evidence to support the 
judge's verdict that Brookside's rejection of her application as 
a tenant to be reasonable." (Appellant's Reply Brief, page 33.) 
This is simply not true. As a matter of law, a mobile home park 
cannot reject a prospective tenant based on an incomplete credit 
report without giving the prospective tenant an opportunity to 
explain why the credit report was incomplete. Brookside refused 
3In the Estate of Morrison, the Court held that a may not 
"introduce" an "entirely new argument on appeal." (Estate of 
Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Utah [Ct. ] App. 1997)). In this 
case, the basis for denying Ms. Southworth the opportunity to 
apply for residency or meet with the Park Manager was Western 
Credits inability to'"verify employment." (T. at 70.) 
Introducing Ms. Southworth's tax returns into evidence had 
nothing to do with preserving for appeal the issue of whether 
Brooksides' behavior was "unreasonable." 
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to give Ms. Southworth the opportunity to do so and refuse to 
accept an application from her. Ms. Southworth stood ready and 
willing to provide her tax returns and other financial 
information to Brookside. Brookside never gave her that 
opportunity. 
Brookside states that it ''rejected [Ms. Southworth's] 
application based on her financial inadequacies as documented in 
her credit report." (Appellant's Reply Brief, pg 35.) The only 
"financial inadequacies" in Ms. Southworth's credit report were 
Western Reports comments that it was "unable to verify" Ms. 
Southworth's employment and that Ms. Southworth's bank "would not 
verify information over the phone." (T. 69, lines 17-22.) When 
Ms. Southworth tried to provide this information to Brookside, 
the Park Manager refused to meet with her. That is unreasonable. 
The Mobile Home Park Residency Act provides that "approval" 
of a prospective purchaser of a mobile home who intends to become 
a resident of the park may not be "unreasonably withheld." For 
Brookside to refuse to even meet with or accept an application 
from a prospective purchaser is per se "unreasonable." 
Brookside's actions in this case are contrary to the overall 
purpose of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, which states: 
The fundamental right to own and protect 
land and to establish conditions for its 
use by others necessitate[s] that the 
owner of a mobile home park be provided 
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with speedy and adequate remedies 
against those who abuse the terms of a 
tenancy. The high cost of moving mobile 
homes,- the requirement of mobile home 
parks relating to their installation, 
and the cost of landscaping and lot 
preparation necessitate that the owners 
of mobile homes occupied within mobile 
home parks be provided with protection 
from actual or constructive eviction. 
It is the purpose of this chapter to 
provide protection for both the owners 
of mobile homes located in mobile home 
parks and . . . the owners of mobile 
home parks. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-2 (1994) (emphasis added.); see also 
Coleman v. Thomas, 2000 UT 53, fl9, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 
(recognizing that the Mobile Home Park Residency Act serves the 
twofold purpose of protecting park residents and park owners). 
The Act specifically recognizes "the high cost of moving mobile 
homes." In this case, Brookside rejected Ms. Southworth, the 
third prospective purchaser that Sam Peebles brought to the Park. 
As a result, Sam Peebles lost a sale of his mobile home for 
$25,000 in September, 1996. (See Appellees' Brief at 10-13.) 
Sam Peebles continued to pay lot rent, even though the Mobile 
Home was vacant and Brookside had rejected three prospective 
purchasers, including Jackie Southworth. 
Finally, in November, 1997, over one year after Ms. 
Southworth's rejection, the Mobile Home was finally sold and 
moved to Evanston, Wyoming at a net profit of $1,422.50. 
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(Appellees' Brief at 13, paragraph 48) (citation omitted).4 This 
excludes the additional $3,177.00 in lot rent Sam Pebbles had to 
pay from October 25, 1996 through November 20, 1997.5 
The prohibition against ''unreasonably withholding" approval 
for applications for residency by prospective purchasers, which 
is set forth in section 57-16-4(4), was designed to protect 
mobile home owners from the "high cost" of arbitrary and 
capricious refusals by mobile home park owners. It cost 
Brookside so little to be reasonable. It cost Sam Peebles a 
great deal. Instead of selling his home for $25,000 in October, 
1996, he had to move it to Evanston, Wyoming and sold it for a 
net profit of $1,422.50 in November, 1997, plus he had to 
continue to pay lot rent on space #100 from October, 1996 through 
November, 1997. 
The Court of Appeals errored in failing to reverse to jury 
verdict as to Jackie Southworth. In refusing to overturn the 
jury verdict, the Court of Appeals reasoned as follows: 
4
 CiL. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992) 
(stating that xx[t]he term 'mobile home' is somewhat misleading. 
Mobile homes are largely immobile as a practical matter, because 
the cost of moving one is often a significant fraction of the 
value of the mobile home itself."). 
5
 October 25, 1996 was the closing date under the Real 
Estate Purchase Contract between Peebles and Jackie Southworth 
(Trial Exhibit D-67.) November 20, 1997 was the day the Mobile 
Home was finally moved from the Park. 
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Here, the jury heard evidence that Brookside 
was unable to verify Southworth's employment 
and bank account. It also heard evidence 
that the mobile home remained in disrepair 
at that time. Although Southworth testified 
with explanations as to why she should not 
have been penalized for these circumstances, 
the jury was free to disbelieve her and to 
believe Brookside's witnesses to the contrary. 
We therefore conclude that sufficient 
evidence supported the jury's factual 
determination on the reasonableness of 
Brookside's behavior and affirm the jury's 
verdict. 
Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Sam Peebles et. al. 2000 
Utah Ct. App. 314, paragraph 38, 14 P.3d 105 (Emphasis added.) 
The Court of Appeals erroneously assumed that Ms. Southwick 
was able to provide her "explanations" to Brookside. This never 
occurred. The issue is whether it was "unreasonable" for 
Brookside to refuse Ms. Southwick the opportunity to provide 
those explanations. Brookside refused to meet with Ms. Southwick 
and refused to allow her to fill out an application for 
residency. Brookside's refusal to meet with or accept an 
application for residency from Ms. Southworth was a "per se" 
"unreasonable withholding" of approval of residency under the 
Mobile Home Park Residency Act. 
As to the condition of the Mobile Home, Brookside correctly 
states that this is "not an issue on appeal." (Appellant's Reply 
Brief, page 35.) As previously discussed, Jim Prentice refused 
to meet with Ms. Southworth. (T. at 301, line 12-25.) Jim 
Prentice also refused to allow her to discuss the improvements 
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she was going to make to the trailer. (T. at 313, lines 4-18.) 
Ms. Southworth testified that she was planning on putting an 
additional $4,000.00 in improvements into the Mobile Home: 
I had a subcontractor come out with me and 
look at it, and in fact he listed the price 
of what everything would cost me. [T]he cost 
of repairs was about $4,000.00 that I was 
going to put into that trailer. 
(T. at 309, lines 10-15.) 
Ms. Southworth compiled a list of improvements that she was going 
to make, and she wanted to discuss those with Jim Prentice, the 
Park manager. (T. at 312, line 20-22. Again, Ms. Southworth was 
denied the opportunity to meet with Brookside to explain her plan 
to invest an additional $4,000.00 in upgrading the Mobile Home. 
Jim Prentice would not meet with Ms. Southworth. He would 
not allow her to fill out an application for residency. He would 
not allow her to discuss the improvements she was going to make 
to the Mobile Home. He would not allow her to comment on the 
Western Credit report. He would not allow her to discuss her 
financial affairs with him. Brookside alleges that it "extended 
every effort to amicably resolve its dispute with the Peebles." 
(Appellant's Reply Brief, page 37.) This is absolutely false. 
The facts in this case speak for themself. 
If Brookside's behavior in this case was not "unreasonable," 
then Section 57-16-4(4) is a dead letter. For the benefit and 
protection of mobile home owners, this Court must require that 
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mobile home park agents at least meet with prospective applicants 
and at least allow them to fill out an application for residency. 
The refusal to do so -is an "unreasonable withholding" of approval 
for residency in violation of section 57-16-4(4) of the Utah 
Code. The Court of Appeals errored in not reversing the jury 
verdict on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should uphold the Court of Appeals decision that 
the trial court did not "abuse its discretion" in granting 
defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, did not err in granting 
defendants' motion for directed verdict, and did not err in 
denying plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees. 
This Court should find that the issue of whether Brookside 
preserved the "bona fide" purchaser an appeal is moot since the 
Court of Appeals addressed that issue substantially later in its 
opinion, the Court should also find that the Court of Appeals 
correctly found that Brookside did not comply with Rule 24(a)(8) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure with respect to Harold 
Peebles. 
This Court should find that the Court of Appeals errored in 
not overturning the jury verdict. This Court should find that 
Brookside's refusal to meet with or to allow Ms. Southworth to 
fill out an application for residency is a per se violation of 
section 57-16-4(4) of the Utah Code, which provides that approval 
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of a prospective purchaser for residency may not be "unreasonably 
withheld." 
This Court should uphold the Court of Appeal's decision to 
reverse the trial court's denial of defendants' Motion for 
Attorney's Fees and the Court of Appeals decision to award 
defendants' their attorneys fees for defending the eviction 
action on appeal. Peebles should also be awarded attorney's fees 
for successfully defending the eviction action on appeal before 
this Court and before the Court of Appeals, and this Court should 
remand this case for a determination consistent therewith. 
DATED this [P day of December, 2001. 
CRIPPEN St CLINE, L . C . 
/ 7 
R t t s s e l l X. C l i n e 
A t t o r n e y f o r A p p e l l e e s 
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Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Reply Brief of Appellees have been mailed postage pre-
paid on this I3> day "of December, 2001 to the following: 
Dennis K. Poole 
John L. Adams 
Poole, Sullivan & Adams, L.C. 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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APPENDICE A 
(December 4, 1996 letter, with attachment.) 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
DENNIS K. POOLE, P.C. 
ANDREA NUFFER GODFREY 
December 4, 1996 
4543 SOUTH 700 EAST, SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 94107 
TELEPHONE (801) 263-0344 
TELECOPIER (801) 263-1010 
Mr. Russell A. Cline 
CRIPPEN & CLINE 
310 South Main, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Sam Peebles 
Dear Mr. Cline: 
This letter will confirm the stipulation made in Court this 
date that Brookside Mobile Home Park will negotiate the checks 
tendered by Mr. Peebles for monthly rent without prejudice to the 
rights of the parties. 
I am enclosing herewith for your reference copies of the 
checks which we have been holding and which we are forwarding to 
Brookside to deposit. You should be aware that as of December 1, 
1996 a total of $2,115.00 is due and owing for rent. After 
applying the checks we are holding, which total $1,370.00, there is 
a balance of $745.00. Unless we receive this amount in full within 
the next ten (10) days, we will file a Motion for Summary Judgment 
based upon the failure to pay the lot rental. 
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. 
\ VeryN^uly yours, 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
DKP:ec 
Enc. 
cc: Brookside Mobile Home Park, w/checks 
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